Remarital Chances, Choices, and Economic Consequences: Issues of Social and Personal Welfare by Shafer, Kevin & Jensen, Todd M.
The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 
Volume 40 
Issue 2 June Article 6 
2013 
Remarital Chances, Choices, and Economic Consequences: 
Issues of Social and Personal Welfare 
Kevin Shafer 
Brigham Young University 
Todd M. Jensen 
Brigham Young University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw 
 Part of the Social Policy Commons, Social Welfare Commons, and the Social Work Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shafer, Kevin and Jensen, Todd M. (2013) "Remarital Chances, Choices, and Economic Consequences: 
Issues of Social and Personal Welfare," The Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare: Vol. 40 : Iss. 2 , Article 
6. 
Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/jssw/vol40/iss2/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Social Work at ScholarWorks at WMU. For more 
information, please contact maira.bundza@wmich.edu. 
Remarital Chances, Choices, and
Economic Consequences: Issues of Social
and Personal Welfare
KEVIN SHAFER
TODD M. JENSEN
Brig ham Young University
School of Social Work
Many divorced women experience a significant decline in finan-
cial, social, physical, and psychological well-being following a
divorce. Using data from the NLSY79 (n= 2,520) we compare
welfare recipients, mothers, and impoverished women to less
marginalized divorcees on remarriage chances. Furthermore, we
look at the kinds of men these women marry by focusing on the
employment and education of new spouses. Finally, we address
how remarriage and spousal quality (as defined by education and
employment) impact economic well-being after divorce. Our re-
sults show that remarriage has positive economic effects, but that
is dependent upon spousal quality. However, such matches are
rare among divorced women with children and in poverty. The
implications of our results for social welfare issues are discussed.
Key words: children, economic well-being, poverty, remarriage,
spousal quality
Divorce can be a stratifying mechanism for many American
men, women, and children. This stratification can take place
on a number of dimensions (Amato, 2010), including psycho-
logical health, physical health, financial well-being, and access
to resources such as friendship networks and social supports
(Amato & Hohmann-Marriott, 2007) and declines in physical
well-being (Hughes & Waite, 2009). Central to this paper is
the substantial negative effect of divorce on income, wealth,
poverty status, and overall economic well-being (Hughes &
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Waite, 2009; Peterson, 1996; Smock, Manning, & Gupta, 1999;
Waite, Luo, & Lewin, 2009). These effects are significantly more
negative for women than men (McManus & DiPrete, 2001).
Importantly, many divorced women care for children, making
them particularly vulnerable to a significant economic down-
turn following a divorce. Children from divorced families are
disproportionately impoverished, stressed, less educated, and
more likely to engage in risky behavior (Coleman, Ganong, &
Fine, 2000), which can have effects beyond childhood and ado-
lescence (Wolfinger, 2003). Issues with children after divorce
can also significantly stress parents, as divorced parents report
more difficulty raising children and addressing problem be-
haviors than married biological parents (Sweeney, 2010).
Because divorce is a stratifying life event, many people
try to recover the benefits lost because of it. Although there
are a variety of potential solutions to this problem, one quick
and common approach is to remarry (Cherlin, 1992; Waite &
Gallagher, 2001). The positive effects of (re)marriage on individ-
ual well-being are well documented (Frech & Williams, 2007;
Hughes & Waite, 2009; Waite & Gallagher, 2001) and include
significant positive effects on economic well-being. As such,
remarriage is a social welfare issue-despite the fact it is not
typically cast in such a light (Baldock, Manning, & Vickerstaff,
2007). In the United States marriage is strongly associated with
access to resources, social standing, economic advantage, and
overall well-being (Cherlin, 2009). Interestingly, the effect of
marriage for personal and social well-being (Amato, Booth,
Johnson, & Rogers, 2007) has been the impetus for U.S. anti-
poverty programs which encourage marriage among margin-
alized groups such as the poor, welfare recipients, and single
mothers (McLanahan, Amato, & Furstenberg, 2007).
Our paper focuses on the remarital chances of divorced
women in the U.S., who typically see large economic de-
clines after divorce (McManus & DiPrete, 2001) and become
single mothers because of marital dissolution (Goldscheider
& Sassler, 2006). Because of our concern about social welfare
issues surrounding divorce and remarriage, we are particu-
larly interested in economically marginalized women, whom
we conceptualize as women who use welfare assistance, are
below the poverty line, and who care for children (which
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reduces per-capita income and increases the risk for poverty).
We expect that these characteristics will strongly influence if
and when divorced women remarry. Aside from this, however,
is the question of what kind of men disadvantaged divorcees
remarry. Overall, remarriage may have positive benefits for di-
vorced women (Cherlin, 1992, 1999), but the magnitude of the
effect should depend on a husband's personal characteristics
(which we refer to as spousal quality, following the sociologi-
cal literature and for the sake of parsimony). Finally, we assess
whether a remarriage and husband's characteristics improve
economic standing through applying a random effects model
and we emphasize the importance of working toward greater
levels of social justice for economically marginalized divorced
women.
Marriage, Divorce, and Social Welfare
In its broadest definition, social welfare consists of access
to resources that help fulfill social needs. These resources can
be economic, social, or service-oriented (Baldock et al., 2007).
Marriage and family, as an important social institution, helps
individuals access such resources (Baldock et al., 2007). Several
examples regarding the link between marriage and personal
welfare in the U.S. stand out. Economically, marriage is asso-
ciated with substantial increases in income and the opportu-
nity to build wealth (Heimdal & Houseknecht, 2003; Lichter,
Graefe, & Brown, 2003; Painter & Shafer, 2011; Vespa & Painter,
2011). Intergenerational transfers of wealth and economic re-
sources are more likely if someone is married (Fu & Wolfinger,
2011). Socially, married couples typically have large friendship
networks and get more kin support than single people (Treas,
2011). Similarly, religious groups often provide significantly
more social support to married couples and families with chil-
dren than other individuals (Wilcox, 2004). Politically, mar-
riage has been framed as a social welfare issue in the United
States. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act (PRWORA or welfare reform) passed in 1996 included
provisions for marriage promotion and education. More re-
cently, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 provided hundreds of
millions of dollars for programs under the banner of the
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Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI), which promoted mar-
riage as a way to prevent poverty and improve child welfare
(DHHS, 2009).
While marriage is not the sole determining factor of social
or personal welfare in the U.S., it does have significant effects,
provides children with various advantages, and is a stratify-
ing mechanism in the United States. Social science research
indicates that marriage has important effects on various di-
mensions of well-being including quality-of-life, health, social,
psychological, and socioeconomic outcomes (Amato, 2010;
Cherlin, 2009; Sweeney, 2010), which suggests marriage and
family are crucial aspects of social and personal welfare in the
U.S.
It is clear that divorce takes away many marital benefits.
Of course, most people divorce their spouses for very good
reasons, such as abuse or infidelity, even though lack of high
personal satisfaction (e.g., individuals who still say they are
satisfied with their lives) has become an increasingly common
reason for dissolution (Amato, 2010; Amato et al., 2007; Amato
& Hohmann-Marriott, 2007). Whatever the reason, it is clear
that there are substantial negative consequences associated
with ending a marriage, including financial consequences, loss
of social ties, reduced resources, complex social relationships,
and poorer health than continuously married men and women
(see Amato, 2010 for a complete discussion). Figure 1 provides
one way to view the negative economic impact of divorce on
women, including women with children. While men see an
increase in their per-capita income after divorce, women, on
average, see a decline. However, the picture worsens when we
consider the disparate experiences of women with and without
children. Women with children see a substantial decline in
their economic well-being after divorce and it does not sub-
stantially improve with time.
Although the theoretical link between marriage and well-
being should apply to remarriage, it seems the reality is not
as straightforward. Marital dissolution can have long-last-
ing effects on a myriad of outcomes-even after remarriage.
Furthermore, the positive benefits of remarriage appear to be
variable and partially contingent on first marriage experienc-
es. Thus, we argue that remarriage is a social welfare issue-
and one of significance, given that nearly 50% of all marriages
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will end in divorce and nearly two-thirds of American divor-
cees marry a second time (Bramlett & Mosher, 2001; Copen,
Daniels, Vespa, & Mosher, 2012).
Figure 1. Median Per-Capita Income Before and After Marital
Dissolution, by Sex and Parental Status (in 2008 $)
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Remarital Benefits
Several scholars, such as Cherlin (1992), have suggested
remarriage can help alleviate problems caused by divorce.
However, this is a contested empirical question. Several exam-
ples stand out. Hughes and Waite (2009) found that the health
benefit from remarriage was smaller than the health improve-
ment from first marriage and that remarriage only partially
ameliorated the negative effects of divorce on health. Similarly,
Amato and Hohmann-Marriott (2007) found any mental health
benefit of remarriage was limited to men and women in ex-
tremely bad first marriages. How remarriage affects the eco-
nomic fortunes of divorcees is understood to a lesser degree.
However, the limited evidence available suggests that the
economic benefits of remarriage are quite strong for women
(Ozawa & Yoon, 2002). Yet, remarried women are more likely
than continuously married women to report that they feel fi-
nancially unstable (Malone, Stewart, Wilson, & Korsching,
2010), possibly because of the increased roles they take in the
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financial decisions of their new family (van Eeden-Moorefield,
Pasley, Dolan, & Engel, 2007).
However, the benefits accrued in remarriage cannot simply
be captured by considering whether a woman remarries or
not. We explore a potential source of variation in the positive
impact of remarriage by addressing the potential impact of
a husband's characteristics on economic well-being (Lichter
et al., 2003). Marrying a highly-educated or stably employed
man produces various advantages not commonly experienced
by women who do not remarry or remarry men with poorer
economic qualifications. For example, college graduates tend
to have greater economic stability and more financial resourc-
es than high school dropouts (Oppenheimer, 2003), which has
positive returns on family income, short-term and long-term
economic well-being, and both intra- and inter-generational
mobility (Ozawa & Yoon, 2002; Schwartz & Mare, 2005). In
turn, these returns have substantial positive effects for the
couples and families, such as increased stability and access to
resources (Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000; Sweeney, 2002).
Searching for a Remarriage Partner
Critical to our research questions is how divorced women
find second husbands. Typically, researchers have employed
marital search theory (England & Farkas, 1986; Oppenheimer,
1988) to understand matches between spouses. This framework
argues that people seek out the highest quality spouse possible
given their own characteristics and the kinds of partners avail-
able in the marriage market. Numerous characteristics such as
socioeconomic status, marital history, race/ethnicity, religion,
and parental status play into the calculation of if, when, and
whom to marry. For example, desirable characteristics like
high socioeconomic status increase the probability of remar-
riage (Schwartz & Mare, 2005), while less desirable character-
istics such as having a child out-of-wedlock can hinder marital
prospects (Lichter & Graefe, 2007). The availability of partners
with desirable characteristics is also a factor in marital deci-
sions. If numerous potential spouses are available, marriage is
likely, while a paucity of desirable suitors has a negative effect.
As we apply this theory to our paper, economically mar-
ginalized women may have great difficulty in remarrying or
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finding a spouse with good economic attributes such as stable
employment or being highly educated. While this is only one
way to operationalize partner quality, it does represent an ex-
tremely good chance for divorced women to see substantial
increases in their economic well-being and access to social
supports (Kalmijn & Graaf, 2003). In addition to the stigma
divorced women face (Gerstel, 1987; South & Lloyd, 1995;
South, Trent, & Shen, 2001), economically marginalized divor-
cees are not economically advantageous marriage partners for
men and often have children, which has a substantial negative
effect on remarriage itself (Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006). Yet,
these are the exact women who may experience the strongest
benefit of remarriage, in light of the potential economic boost
conferred by a second marriage (Ozawa & Yoon, 2002). This is
especially significant since divorce is often a catalyst for high
rates of poverty among women and children (McManus &
DiPrete, 2001; Peterson, 1996; Smock et al., 1999).
A woman's decision about a potential remarriage partner
can be affected by personal attributes, as well. For example,
many women with high socioeconomic status may choose
to forgo a second marriage because of bad first marriage ex-
periences and/or solid financial standing (Sweeney, 1997).
Similarly, divorced mothers might be very protective of their
children and be highly selective of whom they are willing to
marry (Goldscheider & Kaufman, 2006). Divorced women
who receive public assistance may be less willing to remarry
than other women because marriage can limit or eliminate
welfare benefits (Lichter, Batson, & Brown, 2004). This can
make remarriage a financially risky proposition because a new
husband's financial contribution to the family may or may not
make up for lost public assistance (Lichter et al., 2003).
There are two additional considerations about divorced
women's remarriage behavior. The first issue is when divorced
women remarry. Divorcees with the most financial difficulty
may quickly remarry in order to ease economic pressures
(Sweeney, 1997). However, many economically marginal-
ized women may seek out any remarriage in order to help
support themselves and/or their children-even if they marry
a man with relatively low socioeconomic status. As a result,
a woman's need to find financial support quickly will make
her less selective about her husband's characteristics, affecting
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the number of women who marry well-qualified men. Second,
divorced women may be reluctant to marry again. This hesi-
tance may be rooted in gender distrust because of abuse, infi-
delity, or other bad first marriage experiences (Edin & Kefalas,
2005; Manning, Trella, Lyons, & Du Toit, 2010), the stress asso-
ciated with dissolution and divorce (Amato, 2010), or, in rare
cases, increased happiness post-divorce (Amato & Hohmann-
Marriott, 2007; Waite et al., 2009). However, our expectation
is that most divorced women will want to remarry because
marriage remains a valued institution, even among those who
dissolved their first one (Cherlin, 1992, 2004).
Current Study
While several studies have addressed remarriage for-
mation among women (e.g., Kalmijn & Graaf, 2003; Mott &
Moore, 1983; Sweeney, 1997, 2002a), little research has focused
on the kinds of men with which divorced women repartner
(but see Gelissen, 2004; Shafer, 2009). Further, an emphasis on
characteristics such as poverty, welfare receipt, and caring for
a child have remained relatively ignored. Yet, these are sig-
nificant characteristics and all the more important given the
negative relationship between divorce and financial well-be-
ing. As a result, we take our analysis a step further by address-
ing the impact of remarriage and remarrying a man who is
stably-employed and well-educated on economic well-being
for these women. Thus, our analysis considers the chances of
remarriage and why it matters for women. We hypothesize
that economically marginalized women who use welfare, are
in poverty, and/or are single mothers, will be less likely to
remarry, less likely to remarry economically stable men, and
more likely to enter into marriages which offer little to no eco-
nomic benefit.
It is important to note that we limit our analysis to het-
erosexual remarriage and do not include other family types,
such as cohabiting or homosexual families. Although cohabi-
tation is the most prominent non-marital family form in the
United States and plays an important role in American family
life, we address only remarriage because cohabitation requires
less commitment, is often viewed as a part of the post-divorce
courting process, and rarely results in couples combining their
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economic resources (Wu & Schimmele, 2005; Xu, Hudspeth, &
Bartkowski, 2006).
Method
Data
We use the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979
cohort (henceforth NLSY79), a nationally representative longi-
tudinal sample of 12,686 men and women born between 1957
and 1965. The data were collected annually from 1979 to 1994
and biennially between 1994 and 2008-the last wave of publi-
cally available NLSY data. Importantly, NLSY79 includes a full
marital and relationship history, key demographic information
about the spouse, variables on socioeconomic status, and other
important personal information. We limit our data to women
who have experienced a divorce from their first marriage
because higher order marital dissolution is extremely selec-
tive (Teachman, 2008). Women who divorced and remarried
prior to 1979 are excluded from our analytic sample because
we lack information on their first marriage and first year of
remarriage. Our final analytic sample consists of 2,520 women
who divorced between 1979 and 2008.
The data are in an event-history format, where respondents
are at-risk for a remarriage from the time they separate or
divorce until they remarry or are no longer observed in the data
(either through attrition or the end of the observation period).
Available evidence suggests that individuals who are separat-
ed from their spouse actively search for a new partner, even if
their union has not been legally dissolved (Sweeney, 1997). Of
course, many separated couples will reunite (Bumpass, Sweet,
& Martin, 1990), which caused us to only include years that
a respondent is separated from their spouse if it is followed
by a divorce without reunion. If a respondent does not report
separation from their spouse, the at-risk period begins in the
year of divorce. Thus, individuals contribute observations to
the model until they exit the data through remarriage or at-
trition (by non-response or the end of the data in 2008). Each
year a respondent is not remarried is treated as a separate
observation as a person-year. Our sample includes a total of
20,591 person-years.
Demographically, our sample is 39% Black, 42% White,
85
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
and 18% Latino. Thirty-four percent of respondents did not
complete high school, 37% are high school graduates, 22%
have some college education, and 6% completed post-second-
ary education. For our key variables, 14% of the women in the
sample received welfare, 32% were in poverty, and 68% had
co-residential children.
Measures
Dependent variables. We have four dependent measures. The
first variable is a dichotomous event variable indicating if the
respondent remarried in a given year. Our second and third
dependent variables are multinomial and focus on the quality
of a woman's second husband. We include variables which
measure whether a husband has full-time employment and
if the new husband attended college. There are three possible
outcomes for these variables: (1) remarried and new husband
meets this condition; (2) remarried, but husband does not meet
this condition; and (3) not remarried. Husbands are considered
full-time employed if they average 40 or more hours of work
per week. A spouse is college educated if he has 13 or more
years of education.
Our final dependent variable is used in our analysis of how
remarriage and spousal characteristics affect economic well-
being. In this model we use a time-varying measure for percent
of poverty level. We calculated this measure by using total
family income from all sources and adjusting these figures to
2008 dollars and dividing by income at 100% of poverty. 100%
of poverty was calculated from the Census' official poverty
line based on family size, as indicated by the number of adults,
biological, step, or adopted children in the household.
Duration. Our models all make use of longitudinal data
which require a measure of duration. We use years since
separation or divorce. If a respondent reported that she was
separated from her spouse, we begin to count the duration
to event or censoring from that time. We also control for age
in our models, which is time-varying from year-to-year and
can strongly affect the chances a woman will remarry (Shafer,
2009). The correlation between the duration variable and age is
not prohibitively high at 0.51.
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Key independent variables. We have three key independent
variables: welfare receipt, poverty status, and the presence of
a co-residential child from a prior marriage. Respondents in
NLSY79 are asked if they received welfare assistance in the
previous year and the source of that assistance. Individuals
who reported AFDC or TANF (after welfare reform) assistance,
WIC, food stamps, or housing assistance were coded as having
received welfare. This variable is a dichotomous measure and
is time-varying. Poverty status is a time-varying dichotomous
variable constructed using family income, family size, and
the Census' official poverty line in each year. Importantly, we
lagged these two variables so they indicate that the respon-
dent received welfare assistance or was in poverty in the prior
year. This was done for two reasons: (1) it allowed us to assess
changes in the effect of marriage on poverty status; and (2)
it allowed us to address the potential attractiveness of poor
women in the remarriage market better than if we measured
welfare receipt and poverty status concurrently with a po-
tential marriage (Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000; Oppenheimer,
2003). Finally, the presence of a co-residential child or children
is measured by a time-varying dichotomous variable indicat-
ing if the respondent was a primary caregiver for any biologi-
cal or adopted children from a previous marriage in the prior
year.
Control variables. As we noted earlier, marital search theory
suggests that a number of personal characteristics affect entry
into marriage and whom one marries (see Kalmijn, 1998 for a
full discussion). In addition to affecting a woman's remarriage
prospects, these variables are also associated with the likeli-
hood they will use welfare, be in poverty, and/or have chil-
dren. As a result, we include a number of control variables in
our analyses. Socioeconomic status affects marital likelihood
(Sweeney, 2002), welfare use, and poverty status. Employment
status was measured by a set of time-varying control variables
indicating if the respondent had full-time work (35 or more
hours a week), part-time work (less than 35 hours a week),
or was unemployed. We also include time-varying measures
of educational attainment for less than 12 years of schooling
(less than high school graduate), 12 years (high school gradu-
ate), 13-15 years (some college), and 16 or more years (college
graduate).
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Religious individuals are less likely to divorce (Call &
Heaton, 1997) and some religious groups have a higher pro-
clivity toward remarriage (Kalmijn & Graaf, 2003). As a result,
we control for religious affiliation with dichotomous variables
for Mainline Protestant, Conservative Protestant, Catholic, and
other religious affiliation. Minority racial and ethnic groups
are more likely to divorce (Teachman, 2002) and less likely to
remarry than Whites. Further, racial and ethnic minorities are
at a distinct socioeconomic disadvantage in the United States
(Cherlin, 2010). As a result, we include variables for non-His-
panic Black, Hispanic, and non-Hispanic White. We control for
family structure at age 14 (single parent family, two biological
parents, stepparent present, or other structure) because of its
strong effects on marital behaviors (Wolfinger, 2007). Divorce,
remarriage, socioeconomic status, and welfare usage all vary
across geographic areas (United States Census Bureau, 2008).
Urban-rural and South-non South differences are particularly
striking. As a result, we include controls for urban and south-
ern residence. Finally, cohabitation may be an alternative to
or route into remarriage (Xu et al., 2006). Thus, we include a
variable for the number of years the respondent has cohabited
since separation or divorce.
Analytic Method
We use two methods in our paper. First, we use event-
history methods to model the transition to remarriage and
the chances of finding a husband with positive economic at-
tributes. We use a specific class of event-history models, dis-
crete-time logistic regression in our analyses, allowing us to
determine when an individual marries, the attributes of their
spouse, and how both time-varying and time-constant vari-
ables affect these outcomes. These methods are also useful
because the assumptions of the model are not restrictive,
can account for right censoring, and measure risk of event at
each time-point (Allison, 1984). We address our emphasized
characteristics-welfare receipt, poverty status, and having
children-by making comparisons with women who do not
receive welfare, are not in poverty, and do not have children. In
essence, our study compares the remarriage patterns of mar-
ginalized and less marginalized divorcees.
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Next, to assess how remarriage and spousal choice affect
economic well-being, we used fixed effects models in order to
incorporate time-varying characteristics for remarriage, new
husband's attributes, and a woman's time-varying characteris-
tics on percent of poverty (Hoffmann, 2004). Using a Hausman
test, we considered the possibility that our data may be better
suited for a random effects model. However, the Hausman
showed that fixed effects were more appropriate (H = 1868.52;
p < .001). Our data for this analysis are different than that used
for our analysis of remarriage. In this model we use years
since divorce as a meaningful time metric and women are in-
cluded from the time of marital dissolution to the dissolution
of their second marriage or until the data ends in 2008. Fixed
effects models can only include time-varying variables, as all
time consistent differences between individuals are controlled
out (Kbhler, Kohler, & Kreuter, 2005; Singer & Willett, 2003);
we only include variables for time since divorce, time since
divorce-squared, years remarried (0 = not remarried), and hus-
band's attributes (stable employment and college attendance)
in our models. Correlations between these variables are not
prohibitively high. All analyses were run in Stata 12.0.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
In our sample, 54% of all women got remarried. Women
on welfare and women in poverty were less likely to remarry,
with 44% and 37% entering a second marriage, respective-
ly. Women with children were about as likely to remarry as
women generally.
Of women who did remarry, 66% of all women married a
man with full-time employment. Considerably fewer women
who used welfare married a stably employed man (48%), while
only 15% of impoverished women did so. Similarly, while half
of divorced women married a man who attended college, only
27% of welfare recipients and 14% of impoverished women
made similar matches. Mothers were similar to the percent-
ages for the full sample of women (65% and 45%, respectively)
on both outcomes. Thus, our descriptive results show that the
89
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Table 1. Odds Ratios for Remarriage and Relative Risk Ratios for Marrying a Spouse
with Given Characteristics.(continued next page)
Remarriage Spouse Full-Time Employed
Remarried FT spouse Une PT
vs. not vs. not Unemployed Unemp ed
remarried remarried spouse vs. not VS.W
remarried spouse
Time
Yrs since dissolution
Yrs since dissolution squared
Yrs since dissolution cubed
Age
1.120 1.403 1.012
0.969 0.937 0.984 *
1.001 1.002 1.000 *
0.980 0.931 1.050 ***
Key Independent Variables
Rec'd welfare in prior year 0.959 0.695 1.494 "
In poverty in prior year 0.426 ** 0.241 ** 0.791
Co-residential child from divorce 0.937 1.014 0.921
Employment (ref. =full-time employed)
Part-time employment
Does not work outside home
Education (ref. high school graduate)
< High school
Some college
College graduate
Yrs cohabited after divorce
South
Urban
Religious Affiliation (ref.= other)
Conservative Protestant
Catholic
1.208 " 1.367 ** 0.954
1.278 a 1.335 1.073
1.031 1.116 0.919
0.941 0.977 0.954
0.803 0.797 0.880
0.857 0.849 a* 0.872 ***
1.206 1.317 * 1.071
0.862 0.883 0.825
0.974
0.885
0.867 1.076
0.876 0.877
Mainline Protestant 0.883 0.906 0.809
Race/Ethnicity (ref.= Non-Hispanic White)
Non-Hispanic Black 0.584 0.509 0.666
Hispanic 1.036 0.912 1.181
0.722
1.050
0.999 *
1.128 **
2.151
3.287
0.908
0.698 **
0.804
0.823
0.977
1.104
1.027
0.814
0.934
1.240
1.001
0.893
1.309
1.294
Family Structure at age 14 (ref.= other)
Two parents 1.170 1.263 1.031 0.816
Step-parent present 1.259 1.315 1.177 0.895
Single parent 0.993 0.967 0.992 1.026
Observations (years) 20,591 20,591 20,591
Observations (respondents) 2,143 2,143 2,143
-2 log likelihood 1,172.22 1,566.78 1,357.92
Psuedo R-squared 0.119 0.135 0.117
Souce: National Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort *"p<.001, "p<.Ol, *p<.05 (two-tailed test)
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Table 1. Odds Ratios for Remarriage and Relative Risk Ratios for Marrying a Spouse
with Given Characteristics.(continued from previous page)
Spouse Attended College
College Spouse not Spouse not
educated college edu- college educated
spouse vs. not cated vs. not vs. college edu-
remarried remarried cated spouse
Time
Yrs since dissolution 1.135 1.113 0.980
Yrs since dissolution squared 0.967 * 0.970 * 1.003
Yrs since dissolution cubed 1.001 * 1.001 * 1.000
Age 1.005 0.963 0.958
Key Independent Variables
Rec'd welfare in prior year 0.714 1.070 1.499
In poverty in prior year 0.358 ** 0.460 ** 1.286
Co-residential child from divorce 0.817* 1.041 1.275*
Employment (ref.=full-time employed)
Part-time employment 1.134 1.267 " 1.117
Does not work outside home 1.171 1.349 1.152
Education (ref.= high school graduate)
< High school 0.892 1.069 1.198
Some college 1.392 0.696 0.500
College graduate 1.460 0.354 0.243
Yrs cohabited after divorce 0.860 0.854 0.994
South 1.232* 1.178* 0.956
Urban 1.137 0.720 0.634
Religious Affiliation (ref. other)
Conservative Protestant 0.917 1.016 1.108
Catholic 0.902 0.879 0.975
Mainline Protestant 0.817 0.943 1.155
Race/Ethnicity (ref.= Non-Hispanic White)
Non-Hispanic Black 0.490 0.675 1.378
Hispanic 0.843 1.208 1.432*
Family Structure at age 14 (ref.= other)
Two parents 1.271 1.106 0.870
Step-parent present 1.229 1.269 1.032
Single parent 1.192 0.873 0.732
Observations (years)
Observations (respondents)
-2 log likelihood
Psuedo R-squared
Souce: National Survey of Youth, 1979 cohort **p<.001, "p<.Ol, *p<.05 (two-tailed test)
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prospects of marrying an economically well-qualified man are
not particularly good in remarriage generally; they are particu-
larly poor for the most economically marginalized women.
Estimating the Odds of Remarriage and Marriage to an
Economically Stable Husband
We report the odds ratios for remarriage and relative risk
ratios for marrying a full-time employed spouse and spouse
who attended college in Table 2. Our results show that some
economically marginalized divorced women are slower to and
less likely to remarry. Women in poverty have 57.4% lower
odds of remarriage in any given year after divorce than women
not in poverty. We found no significant differences between
welfare recipients and non-welfare recipients, nor between
mothers and women without children. Among our other vari-
ables, less than full-time employment and Southern residence
lead to a higher likelihood of remarriage, while increased age,
cohabitation, and urban residence decrease it. Additionally,
Black women were less likely to remarry than White women.
Turning to the analysis of marriage to a full-time employed
husband, our results indicate that economically marginalized
divorcees are less likely to remarry a stably employed man
and often marry a man with less than full-time employment
quickly. The odds of marrying a part-time or unemployed
man were 1.151 times higher for welfare recipients and 2.287
times higher for impoverished women, than for their respec-
tive comparison groups. This indicates that when women who
use welfare or are in poverty marry, they tend to find under-
employed or unemployed spouses.
Our analysis of marriage to a college-educated husband
yields similar results. Women in poverty and mothers are
less likely to find husbands who attended college than they
are to not remarry. In our comparisons of marital outcomes,
our results show that, in any given year, mothers have 27.5%
higher odds of marrying a man who did not attend college
than a man who has some college education. No statistically
significant differences for this comparison were observed for
welfare receipt or poverty.
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Table 2. Fixed Effects Models for Poverty Ratio
m . . 3.444*** 3.537***
(0.884) (0.886)
. . 0.116** -0.119**Time since divorce-squared (0.036) (0.036)(0.036) (0.036)
Years remarried (0= not remarried) 4 - 4394***(0.385) (0.385)
-1.608Husband full-time employed (13.254)
40.165*Husband college educated (16.168)
n (person years) 32,795 32,795
n (maximum years observed) 30 30
n (respondents) 2,143 2,143
Intercept 200.565 199.490
Rho (Interclass Correlation) 0.081 0.080
Estimated R-square 0.03 0.03
The Economic Benefits of Remarriage
The results of our fixed effects model are reported in Table
3. Model 1 focuses on the effect of time since divorce, its qua-
dratic form, and years since remarriage on poverty ratio (i.e.,
a poverty ratio of 100 would be exactly at the poverty line).
Our results show that each additional year after divorce is as-
sociated with an increase in the poverty ratio of slightly more
than 3%, although the size of this increase moderates over
time. Looking at our measure of years since remarriage, we
found that each additional year since remarriage provides
more than a 4% increase in economic well-being. In Model 2,
we added variables for husband's characteristics. The results
for time since divorce and remarriage are substantively similar
to those presented in Model 1. While stable employment does
not have a significant effect on economic well-being, marry-
ing a husband who attended college has a substantial positive
effect. In fact, we observe a 40% increase in poverty ratio from
marrying a college educated man.
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Discussion
While several studies have addressed remarriage forma-
tion among women (e.g., Koo, 1980; McNamee & Raley, 2011;
Sweeney, 1997), the impact of economic vulnerability on re-
marriage chances and the kinds of men divorced women
remarry has not received significant attention. We extend the
literature further by focusing on the impact of these matches
on previously-married women (but see Ozawa & Yoon, 2002).
Additionally, we address this question because of its important
social welfare implications. Simply put, remarriage provides
one opportunity to access important economic, social, political,
health, and other resources to women who often experience
extremely negative effects of divorce. Our analyses focused on
three areas. First, we addressed which women remarry with a
specific focus on three marginalizing post-divorce characteris-
tics: poverty, welfare receipt, and caring for children. Next, we
modeled the impact of these three characteristics on the eco-
nomic quality of a new husband. We operationalized spousal
quality as marrying a man with steady employment or who
attended college (Qian, Lichter, & Mellott, 2005). Finally, we
used fixed effects models to assess how remarriage alone and
remarriage to men with given characteristics affects economic
well-being in remarried families.
We have three main findings from our paper. First, poverty,
but neither welfare receipt nor having children, has a signifi-
cant negative effect on the likelihood of remarriage. On the
one hand, these results suggest that many women who could
benefit from remarriage are not any less likely to remarry than
women who are less economically vulnerable. On the other
hand, women who are in poverty are the least likely to enter
remarriage-which may result in a number of difficulties for
themselves and any children they may have. However, while
(re)marriage may confer benefits, the size of the benefits re-
ceived through marital unions depends, in part, on spousal
quality.
Second, economically marginalized women had low likeli-
hoods of marrying a full-time employed man or college-educat-
ed man. In terms of marrying a stably employed man, women
who receive welfare or who are impoverished are much more
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likely to marry a man who is employed part-time or unem-
ployed than to find a husband with full-time employment. In
our analysis of marriage to a college-educated man, we found
that women with children had a higher likelihood of marrying
less-educated men than women without children. Again, these
marriages appear to happen relatively quickly. No other dif-
ferences were observed for our key variables. Although each
group had different patterns with respect to the kinds of men
they marry, our results show that economically marginalized
women are more likely to marry less economically qualified
men than their non-marginalized counterparts.
Third, we found that remarriage has a small positive effect
on the economic fortunes of divorced women. However, when
we included husband's economic characteristics, our results
showed a substantial positive effect of marrying a college-ed-
ucated man on economic well-being. Yet, this is the group that
economically marginalized women are least likely to marry.
Women in poverty have a particularly low likelihood of doing
so, and mothers are significantly more likely to marry a man
who did not attend college than one who did. Thus, a char-
acteristic which has the most substantial impact on economic
well-being after divorce is the one marginalized women are
least likely to find in the remarriage market.
Our findings, however, should be tempered by the limita-
tions of our analyses. Although NLSY79 has several strengths,
our sample is limited in other ways. The data come from a
cohort of individuals born between 1957 and 1965 and are
not representative of women from other birth cohorts. Our
data also lack information on several factors which have been
linked to remarriage formation such as divorce initiation,
attitudes about divorce and remarriage, and other impor-
tant spousal characteristics, such as prior marital status and
having children (e.g., Sweeney, 1997, 2010). As a result, there
may be important selection factors for which our paper cannot
account. Nevertheless, we feel that our data are of sufficient-
ly high quality, especially when considering the lack of data
about remarriage in the United States (Sweeney, 2010), that our
results are useful in understanding an issue with significant
social consequences.
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Implications
Our paper has important implications for family and welfare
policy. For one, the U.S. government has linked welfare receipt
and anti-poverty policies to marriage since 1996's welfare
reform. The Healthy Marriage Initiative (HMI) promotes mar-
riage formation and discourages divorce through a variety of
methods (DHHS, 2009). In recent years, some of these efforts
have been directed at divorced women (Manning et al., 2010).
While having women marry and stay married may be a worth-
while goal, the evidence suggests that spousal quality is an im-
portant component of even the most rudimentary definitions
of marital success and economic well-being within a marriage
(Huston & Melz, 2004). Our results indicate it is unlikely that
marriage promotion efforts as part of PRWORA and HMI will
truly address the problems of disadvantaged divorced women.
In other words, the prospects of a marriage producing solid
economic benefits are limited, given the kinds of men disad-
vantaged divorced women remarry-which may ultimately
undermine how successful a marriage may be. These insights
also have important implications for clinicians working with
divorced women who want to remarry at some point or are in
serious relationships. These issues are particularly applicable
as clinicians seek to help economically marginalized clients
explore their relational options and better understand the po-
tential obstacles or undesirable outcomes they might encoun-
ter in that process.
Defenders of marriage promotion policies may argue that
they are less anti-poverty programs than programs intended to
sell the benefits of traditional family life to a group skeptical of
marriage. However, a significant literature suggests that poor
women have extremely positive impressions of marriage-so
much so that out of respect for the institution they avoid rela-
tionships they feel do not stand on solid financial or emotional
footing (Cherlin, Cross-Bamet, Burton, & Garrett-Peters, 2008;
Edin & Kefalas, 2005). Although our paper cannot address
this question due to a lack of sufficient data on the remarriage
plans of divorced women, we would argue that there is little
evidence to support the notion that the previously-married
value marriage any less than the never-married. In fact, high
rates of remarriage have been interpreted by family scholars
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as evidence of marriage's institutional strength in the United
States (Cherlin, 1992, 2004). Thus, the problem is not that poor
women, even if they are divorced, do not want to get married.
Instead, the problem stems from the personal characteristics,
often the cause of divorce, which make marrying or remarrying
difficult-a point our paper addresses more straightforwardly.
Although there is a healthy debate about the degree to
which the government should promote marriage, enact poli-
cies that affect the family, or support traditional family forms,
the mounting evidence suggests that marriage promotion pol-
icies do not always promote social justice, social welfare, or
personal well-being. For example, women who live below the
poverty line are almost 60% less likely to remarry than women
who are not in poverty. But, our findings are even starker
when we move beyond the consideration of whether or not
divorced women remarry, but consider the kinds of men they
might partner with and the benefits these kinds of marriag-
es offer. Perhaps anti-poverty programs for divorced women
would be more beneficial if they were aimed elsewhere. For
example, our results show that welfare receipt does not have
negative effects on remarriage or chances of marrying a col-
lege-educated spouse. Therefore, in addition to the clinical im-
plications mentioned above, we recommend that social service
agencies, social workers, and other helping professionals who
can advocate for divorced women should do their best to help
this group utilize services and receive all benefits possible.
Such action could have substantial effects on the lives of both
women and their children as divorced women consider and
pursue remarriage.
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